Gibson, True (2026) Intention-Sensitivity in the Evolution of Moral Responsibility Judgment. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I provide an evolutionary explanation for how and why intentionality came to figure centrally in human moral responsibility judgment (MRJ). I show that being sensitive to the intentionality of others’ actions pre-dates moral cognition, which made it available to the earliest forms of MRJ. I then argue that intention-sensitivity also increased the fitness benefits of MRJ, particularly with respect to adaptive partner choice, by improving evaluations about the desirability of potential cooperative partners. Since intention-sensitivity was both available and useful for MRJ, we ought to infer that it was indeed used in that application from the outset.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Gibson, True trueg@uci.edu
Keywords:	Moral Responsibility, Evolution, Intentionality, Moral Psychology, Partner Choice
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Psychology > Evolutionary Psychology Specific Sciences > Psychology > Comparative Psychology and Ethology Specific Sciences > Psychology > Developmental Psychology
Depositing User:	True Gibson
Date Deposited:	21 Jan 2026 13:42
Last Modified:	21 Jan 2026 13:42
Item ID:	27967
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Psychology > Evolutionary Psychology Specific Sciences > Psychology > Comparative Psychology and Ethology Specific Sciences > Psychology > Developmental Psychology
Date:	20 January 2026
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27967

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