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An Inductive No-Miracles Argument

Golemon, Luke (2026) An Inductive No-Miracles Argument. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper defends the spirit of Golemon and Graber’s Deductive No-Miracles Argument (DNMA) for scientific realism against Kok Yong Lee’s recent criticisms. While Lee argues that the DNMA is invalid or leads to a collapse in probability assignments, I develop a revised Inductive No-Miracles Argument (INMA) that preserves logical strength without relying on abductive inference or explanatory premises. By introducing an “approximately equal” probabilistic operator (≈), I show how probabilistic reasoning can license a strong inductive inference without collapsing probability calculus. The resulting INMA satisfies the desiderata motivating the DNMA and clarifies how probabilistic reasoning can underwrite realist inference without appeal to explanatory virtue. Moreover, the structure argued for seems ripe for use in other contexts where avoiding abduction in lieu of less theory-laden probability is attractive, such as fine-tuning arguments and evolutionary debunking arguments.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Golemon, Lukelukegolemon@gmail.com0000-0001-8989-2751
Keywords: NMA, induction, probability, deduction, abduction
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Dr. Luke Golemon
Date Deposited: 17 Mar 2026 11:21
Last Modified: 17 Mar 2026 11:21
Item ID: 28642
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 2026
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/28642

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