Weirich, Paul (2006) Initiating Coordination. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player’s utility maximization among his strategies does not ground coordination. What background conditions and principles of rationality suffice? This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts leads to a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium. It uses principles of individualistic reasoning to justify a method of initiating coordination. Its account of strategic reasoning elaborates a classical treatment of coordination.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Weirich, Paul
Keywords:	coordination
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory
Depositing User:	Paul Weirich
Date Deposited:	06 Oct 2006
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:14
Item ID:	2942
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory
Date:	2006
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2942

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