Fan, Yao (2026) Regulating Strategic Track-Record Building: Institutional Remedies for Individual Expert Identification. [Preprint]
![[img]](https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text
Regulating Strategic Track Record Building_Full.pdf Download (775kB) |
Abstract
This paper discusses the phenomenon of strategic track-record building in the context of Expert Identification. I present three mathematical models to show (1) track records do improve Novice’s epistemic performance as Goldman (2001, 2021) suggested, (2) Expert can influence Novice’s decision by strategically building track records even when Novice has full information about Expert’s track record, and (3) these influences can only be overcome by regulations at the institutional level. This enriches the existing literature on Expert Identification in two ways. First, it fills a gap in the existing literature on the strategic aspects of track-record building, despite its ubiquitous presence. Second, as the identified caveat can only be overcome via institutional arrangements, it shows that the Expert Identification problem is a problem of so-called “system-oriented social epistemology” even in the one-Expert-one-Novice setting, contra Goldman (2012), who treats it as a paradigmatic example of the study of a single doxastic agent with social evidence.
| Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
| Social Networking: |
| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Creators: |
|
||||||
| Additional Information: | Forthcoming in Synthese | ||||||
| Keywords: | Expert Identification; Track Records; System-Oriented Social Epistemology; Bayesian Persuasion | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Game Theory General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science |
||||||
| Depositing User: | Dr. Yao Fan | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 07 May 2026 11:03 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 07 May 2026 11:03 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 29526 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Game Theory General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science |
||||||
| Date: | 2026 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29526 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
![[feed]](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}