Dubova, Marina and Wagner, Andreas (2026) Nearly neutral theories may facilitate scientific progress. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Abstract
Scientists often avoid theories that are not clearly superior to existing ones. We suggest instead that exploring a wide range of empirically indistinguishable (or even less empirically adequate) theories can support long-term scientific progress. This claim is inspired by an analogy with biological evolution, where many genetic changes are neutral, meaning they produce no observable differences in an organism’s phenotype and fitness. Such neutral variation arises because biological systems are robust to genetic change and it in turn enhances a population’s capacity for innovation. Similar to how genetic changes that produce no observable phenotypic differences and no change in organism’s fitness can be central to the ability of a biological population to evolve, theories that produce no noticeable improvement at a given time may increase the innovative potential of science and improve scientists’ preparedness for future evidence.
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| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | |||||||||
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| Keywords: | explanatory pluralism, neutral variation, evolutionary epistemology | |||||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Theory Change |
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| Depositing User: | Marina Dubova | |||||||||
| Date Deposited: | 05 Jun 2026 19:09 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 05 Jun 2026 19:09 | |||||||||
| Item ID: | 29929 | |||||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Theory Change |
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| Date: | 2026 | |||||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29929 |
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