Elga, Adam
(2007)
How to disagree about how to disagree.
[Preprint]
Abstract
When one encounters disagreement about the truth of a factual claim from a trusted advisor who has access to all of one's evidence, should that move one in the direction of the advisor's view? Conciliatory views on disagreement say "yes, at least a little." Such views are extremely natural, but they can give incoherent advice when the issue under dispute is disagreement itself. So conciliatory views stand refuted. But despite first appearances, this makes no trouble for *partly* conciliatory views: views that recommend giving ground in the face of disagreement about many matters, but not about disagreement itself.
| Item Type: |
Preprint
|
| Creators: |
| Creators | Email | ORCID  |
|---|
| Elga, Adam | | |
|
| Additional Information: |
To appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) *Disagreement*, forthcoming from Oxford University Press. Please cite published version. |
| Keywords: |
epistemology of disagreement, inductive methods, self-undermining |
| Subjects: |
General Issues > Decision Theory |
| Depositing User: |
Adam Elga
|
| Date Deposited: |
07 Dec 2007 |
| Last Modified: |
07 Oct 2010 15:15 |
| Item ID: |
3702 |
| Subjects: |
General Issues > Decision Theory |
| Date: |
October 2007 |
| URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3702 |
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