Dietrich, Franz (2008) The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified. UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they should be competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of uncertainty or probability employed; (ii) no such notion renders both premises simultaneously justified. Especially the independence assumption should be weakened.

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Item Type:	Other
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Dietrich, Franz
Keywords:	Condorcet jury theorem, probability, social choice theory, epistemic democracy, social epistemology, common cause, causal network
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Economics
Depositing User:	Franz Dietrich
Date Deposited:	13 Mar 2008
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:16
Item ID:	3939
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Economics
Date:	March 2008
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3939

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