Sytsma, Justin (2009) Phenomenological Obviousness and the New Science of Consciousness. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? An increasing number of researchers not only hold that it is, but that its very existence is a deep mystery. That this problematic phenomenon exists is generally taken for granted: It is asserted that phenomenal consciousness is just phenomenologically obvious. In contrast, I hold that there is no such phenomenon and, thus, that it does not pose a problem for the brain sciences. For this denial to be plausible, however, I need to show that phenomenal consciousness is not phenomenologically obvious. That is the goal of this article.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Sytsma, Justin
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Depositing User:	Justin Sytsma
Date Deposited:	29 Jan 2009
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:17
Item ID:	4438
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Date:	2009
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4438

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• Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? (deposited 04 Nov 2008)
  • Phenomenological Obviousness and the New Science of Consciousness. (deposited 29 Jan 2009) [Currently Displayed]

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