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Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature

Chen, Eddy Keming and Goldstein, Sheldon (2022) Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature. Ben-Menahem, Y. (eds.). Rethinking the Concept of Law of Nature. pp. 21-64.

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Abstract

The Great Divide in metaphysical debates about laws of nature is between Humeans, who think that laws merely describe the distribution of matter, and non-Humeans, who think that laws govern it. The metaphysics can place demands on the proper formulations of physical theories. It is sometimes assumed that the governing view requires a fundamental / intrinsic direction of time: to govern, laws must be dynamical, producing later states of the world from earlier ones, in accord with the fundamental direction of time in the universe. In this paper, we propose a minimal primitivism about laws of nature (MinP) according to which there is no such requirement. On our view, laws govern by constraining the physical possibilities. Our view captures the essence of the governing view without taking on extraneous commitments about the direction of time or dynamic production. Moreover, as a version of primitivism, our view requires no reduction / analysis of laws in terms of universals, powers, or dispositions. Our view accommodates several potential candidates for fundamental laws, including the principle of least action, the Past Hypothesis, the Einstein equation of general relativity, and even controversial examples found in the Wheeler-Feynman theory of electrodynamics and retrocausal theories of quantum mechanics. By understanding governing as constraining, non-Humeans who accept MinP have the same freedom to contemplate a wide variety of candidate fundamental laws as Humeans do.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Chen, Eddy Kemingeddykemingchen@ucsd.edu0000-0001-5144-0952
Goldstein, Sheldonoldstein@math.rutgers.edu
Keywords: laws of nature, explanation, non-Humeanism, Humeanism, direction of time, probability, typicality, fundamentality, constraint, production, causation, primitivism, simplicity, governing, past hypothesis
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Gravity
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Depositing User: Dr. Eddy Keming Chen
Date Deposited: 18 Jun 2022 14:48
Last Modified: 18 Jun 2022 14:48
Item ID: 20764
Journal or Publication Title: Ben-Menahem, Y. (eds.). Rethinking the Concept of Law of Nature
Publisher: Springer
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-03...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1007/978-3-030-96775-8_2
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Gravity
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Date: 12 February 2022
Page Range: pp. 21-64
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20764

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