Freeborn, David Peter Wallis (2024) Rational Factionalization for Agents with Probabilistically Related Beliefs. [Preprint]

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Abstract

General epistemic polarization arises when the beliefs of a population grow further apart, in particular when all agents update on the same evidence. Epistemic factionalization arises when the beliefs grow further apart, but different beliefs also become correlated across the population. I present a model of how factionalization can emerge in a population of ideally rational agents. This kind of factionalization is driven by probabilistic relations between beliefs, with background beliefs shaping how the agents' beliefs evolve in the light of new evidence. Moreover, I show that in such a model, the only possible outcomes from updating on identical evidence are general convergence or factionalization. Beliefs cannot spread out in all directions: if the beliefs overall polarize, then it must result in factionalization.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Freeborn, David Peter Wallis dfreebor@uci.edu 0000-0002-2117-8145
Keywords:	polarization; factionalization; rationality; social epistemology; formal epistemology; rational polarization; rational factionalization; network epistemology; Bayesianism; Bayesian networks; Bayesnets; philosophy of the social sciences; philosophy of science; philosophy of social science; Bayesian epistemology; Bayesian rationality; social and formal epistemology; computer simulations; social dynamics; Jeffrey conditioning; Jeffrey conditionalization; Bayesian dynamics;
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Formal Learning Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science Specific Sciences > Psychology > Social Psychology
Depositing User:	David Freeborn
Date Deposited:	03 Jan 2024 20:56
Last Modified:	03 Jan 2024 20:56
Item ID:	22907
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Formal Learning Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science Specific Sciences > Psychology > Social Psychology
Date:	3 January 2024
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22907

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