Csatári, Ferenc (2024) In Defense of a Constructive Truth Concept. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I address some major critical arguments against a constructive truth concept and intuitionist logic. I put the notions of in principle possibilities and valid constructions (mathematical proofs) under scrutiny. I argue that the objections against a constructive account of truth miss target, thus they are not decisive. Eventually, constructivism is at least as cogent and natural a stance as realism.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Csatári, Ferenc fcsatari@gmail.com 0000-0002-8568-7299
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > History Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Proof Specific Sciences > Mathematics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Ferenc Csatári
Date Deposited:	22 Jun 2024 12:58
Last Modified:	22 Jun 2024 12:58
Item ID:	23609
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > History Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Proof Specific Sciences > Mathematics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	13 February 2024
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23609

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