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How Informational Teleosemantics Works: Towards a Realist Theory of Content

Heemskerk, Johan (2025) How Informational Teleosemantics Works: Towards a Realist Theory of Content. UNSPECIFIED, University of Warwick.

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Abstract

Representations appear to play a central role in cognitive science. Capacities such as face recognition are thought to be enabled by internal states or structures representing external items. However, despite the ubiquity of representational terminology in cognitive science, there is no explicit scientific theory outlining what makes an internal state a representation of an external item. Nonetheless, many philosophers hope to uncover an implicit theory in the scientific literature. This is the project of the current thesis. However, all such projects face an obstacle in the form of Frances Egan's argument that content plays no role in scientific theorising. I respond that, in some limited regions of cognitive science, content is crucial for explanation. The unifying idea is that closer attention to the application of information theory in those regions of cognitive neuroscience enables us to uncover an implicit theory of content. I examine the conditions which must be met for the cognitive system to be modelled using information theory, presenting some constraints on how we apply the mathematical framework. For example, information theory requires identifying probability distributions over measurable outcomes, which leads us to focus specifically on neural representation. I then argue that functions are required to make tractable measures of information, since they serve to narrow the range of possible contents to those potentially explanatory of a cognitive capacity. However, unlike many other teleosemanticists, I argue that we need to use a non-etiological form of function. I consider whether non-etiological functions allow for misrepresentation, and conclude that they do. Finally, I introduce what I argue is the implicit theory of content in cognitive neuroscience: maxMI. The content of a representation is that item in the environment with which the representation shares maximal mutual information.


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Item Type: Other
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CreatorsEmailORCID
Heemskerk, Johanj.heemskerk@warwick.ac.uk0009-0003-7646-4901
Keywords: Information, teleosemantics, representation, structuralism, realism, cognitive neuroscience, cognitive science, functions, explanation
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Computation/Information
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Systems Neuroscience
Depositing User: Dr. Johan Heemskerk
Date Deposited: 31 Jul 2025 13:03
Last Modified: 31 Jul 2025 13:03
Item ID: 26061
Journal or Publication Title: PhD Thesis
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Computation/Information
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Systems Neuroscience
Date: 26 February 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26061

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