Halpin, John F. (2026) Constructivism for Consciousness. [Preprint]

	Text Halpin Constructivism for Consciousness.pdf Download (265kB)
	Text Halpin Constructivism for Consciousness.pdf Download (265kB)

Abstract

The goal of this essay is to promote a non- traditional physicalism for consciousness much as metaethical constructivisms are meant as naturalistic alternatives to traditional moral realism. The account on offer is based on perspectival version of David Lewis's Humean “best- system” account for scientific representation. On this version, suspect concepts are vindicated (from the perspective of a given science) when their use is required for ideal systematization. Lewis's important case, his hard problem, was to provide an Humean vindication of chance insofar as it is a required aspect of ideal physics, the best way (from the perspective of fundamental physics) to give a summary description of regularities. The present essay utilizes Michael Graziano's account of consciousness as proof- of- concept. Personal- level psychology, if Graziano is correct, is best based on a brain schema evolved to systematize attention. This schema would seem to be precisely right for the perspectival best system: a “summary description”
(Graziano's term also) requiring an awareness concept. I argue that the required concept is indeed both subjective and phenomenal so properly termed “awareness.” Moreover, even if Graziano's account is not correct, the constructivist approach described illustrates a new explanatory option for physicalism about the mind.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Halpin, John F. halpin@oakland.edu 0000-0002-7025-495X
Keywords:	consciousness, physicalism, BSA, PBSA, pragmatic best-system account
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness General Issues > Laws of Nature
Depositing User:	Dr. John F. Halpin
Date Deposited:	18 Apr 2026 19:03
Last Modified:	18 Apr 2026 19:03
Item ID:	29250
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness General Issues > Laws of Nature
Date:	2026
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29250

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