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Reliabilist Epistemology Meets Bounded Rationality

Dusi, Giovanni (2024) Reliabilist Epistemology Meets Bounded Rationality. Synthese. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

Epistemic reliabilism holds that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a reliable or truth-conducive process. I argue that reliabilism offers an epistemology for bounded rationality. This latter concept refers to normative and descriptive accounts of real-world reasoning instead of some ideal reasoning. However, as initially formulated, reliabilism involves an absolute, context-independent assessment of rationality that does not do justice to the fact that several processes are reliable in some reasoning environments but not in others, as is widely reported in the cognitive sciences literature. I consider possible solutions to this problem. Resorting to ‘normality reliabilism’, a variant of the theory, is one; but I find it insufficient. Therefore, in addition, I propose to relativise the reliability assessment to reasoning environments. This novel version of reliabilism fits bounded rationality better than the original one does.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Dusi, GiovanniGiovanni.Dusi@uab.cat0000-0002-2132-4157
Keywords: Process reliabilism; Ecological rationality; Heuristics and biases; Normality reliabilism; Heuristics; Reasoning environments
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Mr. Giovanni Dusi
Date Deposited: 18 Apr 2024 06:32
Last Modified: 18 Apr 2024 06:32
Item ID: 23275
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Publisher: Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-0...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04525-y
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 3 April 2024
ISSN: 1573-0964
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23275

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