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Is Peirce's reduction thesis gerrymandered?

Koshkin, Sergiy (2022) Is Peirce's reduction thesis gerrymandered? Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 58 (4). pp. 271-300. ISSN 1558-9587

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Abstract

We argue that traditional formulations of the reduction thesis that tie it to privileged relational operations do not suffice for Peirce's justification of the categories, and invite the charge of gerrymandering to make it come out as true. We then develop a more robust invariant formulation of the thesis by explicating the use of triads in any relational operations, which is immune to that charge. The explication also allows us to track how Thirdness enters the structure of higher order relations, and even propose a numerical measure of it. Our analysis reveals new conceptual phenomena when negation or disjunction are used to compound relations.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Koshkin, Sergiy0000-0001-8264-3701
Keywords: logic of relations; reduction thesis; genuine triads; Thirdness; hypostatic abstraction; bonding algebra; relative product; logical operations; PAL; teridentity; existential graphs; mutual information
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > History of Philosophy
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User: Dr. Sergiy Koshkin
Date Deposited: 11 Jun 2024 17:18
Last Modified: 11 Jun 2024 17:18
Item ID: 23543
Journal or Publication Title: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Publisher: Indiana University Press
Official URL: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/886447
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.2022.a886447
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > History of Philosophy
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date: 2022
Page Range: pp. 271-300
Volume: 58
Number: 4
ISSN: 1558-9587
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23543

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