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Are nonmeasurable sets significant for epistemology?

Li, Yuanshan (2025) Are nonmeasurable sets significant for epistemology? Synthese, 206 (182). pp. 1-27. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

Probabilism holds that rational credence functions are probability functions defined over some probability space $\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P$. According to some recent philosophical arguments, in some situations, rational credence function must be total, i.e.
$F=2^\Omega$, a view which I call credence totalism. Arguments for credence totalism are based on the premise that non-Lebesgue measurable subsets of $\mathbb{R}$ are epistemically significant, in the sense that an agent has reasons to assign probability to these sets. This paper argues that nonmeasurable sets are not epistemically significant in this sense. Consequently, the arguments for credence totalism are not successful. My argument is based on a careful consideration of the role of the Axiom of Choice in probabilistic practice. I also discuss some topics considered closely related, viz. the existence of total chance functions and the truth value of the Continuum Hypothesis. I argue that the role of nonmeasurability in epistemology does not shed light on these issues.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Li, Yuanshanyli45@nd.edu0009-0000-4084-5954
Keywords: Probability; Credence; Measurability; Totalism; Axiom of choice
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Foundations
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Yuanshan Li
Date Deposited: 08 Oct 2025 11:00
Last Modified: 08 Oct 2025 11:00
Item ID: 26424
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Publisher: Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-0...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-05256-4
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Foundations
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 2025
Page Range: pp. 1-27
Volume: 206
Number: 182
ISSN: 1573-0964
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26424

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