Hartmann, Stephan and Meijs, Wouter (2010) Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered. [Preprint]
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Abstract
In a famous experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (1983), featuring Linda the bank teller, the participants assign a higher probability to a conjunction of propositions than to one of the conjuncts, thereby seemingly committing a probabilistic fallacy. In this paper, we discuss a slightly different example featuring someone named Walter, who also happens to work at a bank, and argue that, in this example, it is rational to assign a higher probability to the conjunction of suitably chosen propositions than to one of the conjuncts. By pointing out the similarities between Tversky and Kahneman's experiment and our example, we argue that the participants in the experiment may assign probabilities to the propositions in question in such a way that it is also rational for them to give the conjunction a higher probability than one of the conjuncts.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | |||||||||
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| Additional Information: | This paper will appear in Synthese 179:2 (2011). | |||||||||
| Keywords: | Conjunction fallacy, Linda problem, psychology of reasoning, Bayesian epistemology | |||||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science |
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| Depositing User: | Stephan Hartmann | |||||||||
| Date Deposited: | 06 Aug 2010 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 12 Jul 2024 17:27 | |||||||||
| Item ID: | 5506 | |||||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science |
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| Date: | August 2010 | |||||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5506 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered. (deposited 09 Jun 2009)
- Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered. (deposited 06 Aug 2010) [Currently Displayed]
- Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered. (deposited 27 Nov 2009)
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