Preprint

Asma, Lieke (2023) Implicit bias as unintentional discrimination. [Preprint]

Baccelli, Jean (2017) Do Bets Reveal Beliefs? [Preprint]

Baccelli, Jean (2019) Moral Hazard, the Savage Framework, and State-dependent Utility. [Preprint]

Baccelli, Jean (2019) The Problem of State-Dependent Utility: A Reappraisal. [Preprint]

Baccelli, Jean (2018) Risk Attitudes in Axiomatic Decision Theory – A Conceptual Perspective. [Preprint]

Baccelli, Jean and Mongin, Philippe (2016) Choice-Based Cardinal Utility. [Preprint]

Bach, Theodore (2022) On the Limitations and Criticism of Experimental Philosophy. [Preprint]

Byrd, Nick and Conway, Paul (2019) Not All Who Ponder Count Costs: Arithmetic Reflection Predicts Utilitarian Tendencies, but Logical Reflection Predicts both Deontological and Utilitarian Tendencies. [Preprint]

Callender, Craig (2021) Is Discounting for Tense Rational? [Preprint]

Davis, Isaac (2024) Rational representations of uncertainty: a pluralistic approach to bounded rationality. [Preprint]

Elkin, Lee (2020) Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation. [Preprint]

Gabriel, Nathan and O'Connor, Cailin (2024) Can Confirmation Bias Improve Group Learning? [Preprint]

Greely, Nathaniel (2021) Epistemic feelings, metacognition, and the Lima problem. [Preprint]

Hartmann, Stephan (2020) Bayes Nets and Rationality. [Preprint]

Jurjako, Marko (2022) CAN PREDICTIVE PROCESSING EXPLAIN SELF-DECEPTION? [Preprint]

List, Christian (2024) Decision theory presupposes free will. [Preprint]

List, Christian (2022) The Naturalistic Case for Free Will. [Preprint]

Peruzzi, Edoardo and CEVOLANI, Gustavo (2024) The gatekeeper’s dilemma: Daubert standard, economic experts and judicial reasoning. [Preprint]

Peters, Uwe and Krauss, Alex and Braganza, Oliver (2022) Generalization Bias in Science. [Preprint]

Peters, Uwe and Lemeire, Olivier (2023) Hasty Generalizations Are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy: A Systematic Analysis. [Preprint]

Popa, Elena (2021) Getting Counterfactuals Right: The Perspective of the Causal Reasoner. [Preprint]

Porter, Morgan (2024) Moral Agency in Silico: Exploring Free Will in Large Language Models. [Preprint]

Riemann, Ritsaart and Lynch, Kate E. and Gawronski, Stefan A. and Chan, Jack and Griffiths, Paul E. (2024) Classifying Genetic Essentialist Biases using Large Language Models. [Preprint]

Schiller, Henry Ian (2022) Genericity and Inductive Inference. [Preprint]

Schwarz, Sera (2024) Problems and Prescriptions in Psychiatric Explanation. [Preprint]

Sikorski, Michal and van Dongen, Noah and Sprenger, Jan (2019) Causal Conditionals, Tendency Causal Claims and Statistical Relevance. [Preprint]

Thoma, Johanna (2023) Merely Means Paternalist? Prospect Theory and 'Debiased' Welfare Analysis. [Preprint]

Veit, Walter (2022) Complexity and the Evolution of Consciousness. [Preprint]

Veit, Walter and Browning, Heather (2022) Feminism and Enhancement. [Preprint]

Veit, Walter and Dewhurst, Joe and Dolega, Krzysztof and Jones, Max and Stanley, Shaun and Frankish, Keith and Dennett, Daniel C. (2019) The Rationale of Rationalization. [Preprint]

Veit, Walter and Earp, Brian D. and Browning, Heather and Savulescu, Julian (2021) Evaluating Trade-Offs between Autonomy and Wellbeing in Supported Decision Making. [Preprint]

Waller, Robyn (2021) Weighing in on decisions in the brain: Neural representations of pre-awarenss practical intention. [Preprint]

Woodward, James (2021) Chapter 8: Proportionality. [Preprint]

Published Article or Volume

Arslan, Aran and Zenker, Frank (2024) Cohen’s Convention, the Seriousness of Errors, and the Body of Knowledge in Behavioral Science. Synthese, 204. ISSN 1573-0964

Baccelli, Jean and Schollmeyer, Georg and Jansen, Christoph (2021) Risk Aversion over Finite Domains. Theory and Decision.

Bacelar Valente, Mario (2022) The correctness of reasoning, logical models, and the faithfulness problem. Principia: an international journal of epistemology, 26 (3). pp. 429-447.

Bach, Theodore (2019) Why the Empirical Study of Non-Philosophical Expertise Does Not Undermine the Status of Philosophical Expertise. Erkenntnis, 86 (4). pp. 999-1023.

Farokhi Kakesh, Hadis (2023) Desire satisfaction and its discontents. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 38 (2). pp. 173-192. ISSN 2171-679X

Fischborn, Marcelo (2016) Libet-style experiments, neuroscience, and libertarian free will. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (4). pp. 494-502. ISSN 0951-5089

Fischborn, Marcelo (2018) Questions for a Science of Moral Responsibility. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9 (2). pp. 381-394. ISSN 1878-5158

Gao, Shan (2023) Does quantum cognition imply quantum minds? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 28 (3-4). pp. 100-111.

Heesen, Remco and Romeijn, Jan-Willem (2023) Measurement Invariance, Selection Invariance, and Fair Selection Revisited. Psychological Methods, 28 (3). pp. 687-690. ISSN 1082-989X

Kalpokas, Daniel (2020) Perception as a propositional attitude. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 35 (2). pp. 155-174. ISSN 2171-679X

López Campillo, Jesús (2023) Mental expression and inner speech. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 38 (1). pp. 5-24. ISSN 2171-679X

McCormack, Kael (2023) Desire-as-belief and evidence sensitivity. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 38 (2). pp. 155-172. ISSN 2171-679X

Miller, Ryan (2022) Nonrational Belief Paradoxes as Byzantine Failures. Logos & Episteme, 13 (4). pp. 343-358.

Petracca, Enrico (2023) Social phenomena as a challenge to the scaling-up problem. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

Pineda-Oliva, David (2021) Defending the motivational theory of desire. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 36 (2). pp. 243-260. ISSN 2171-679X

Verdejo, Víctor M. (2020) Norms for pure desire. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 35 (1). pp. 95-112. ISSN 2171-679X

Ward, Zina B. (2022) Cognitive Variation: The Philosophical Landscape. Philosophy Compass.

Woodward, James (2020) Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation. Frontiers in Psychology.