Number of items at this level: **75**.

## A

Acero, Juan José
(2017)
*Alberto Moretti, Eleonora Orlando y Nora Stigol, comp. 2016. A medio siglo de Formas lógicas, realidad y significado de Thomas Moro Simpson.*
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 32 (3).
pp. 387-389.
ISSN 2171-679X

Arenhart, Jonas R. B. and Krause, Décio
(2019)
*Quasi-truth and defective knowledge in science: a critical examination.*
[Preprint]

Asghari, Amir
(2018)
*Equivalence: An Attempt at a History of the Idea.*
[Preprint]

## B

Barrett, Thomas William and Halvorson, Hans
(2015)
*Quine's Conjecture on Many-Sorted Logic.*
[Preprint]

Barrett, Thomas William
(2017)
*What Do Symmetries Tell Us About Structure?*
[Preprint]

Barton, Neil
(2018)
*Forcing and the Universe of Sets: Must we lose insight?*
[Preprint]

Barton, Neil
(2019)
*Forcing and the Universe of Sets: Must we lose insight?*
[Preprint]

Barton, Neil
(2017)
*Independence and Ignorance: How agnotology informs set-theoretic pluralism.*
[Preprint]

Barton, Neil
(2018)
*Large Cardinals and the Iterative Conception of Set.*
[Preprint]

Barton, Neil
(2016)
*Multiversism and Concepts of Set: How much relativism is acceptable?*
[Preprint]

Barton, Neil
(2016)
*Richness and Reflection.*
[Preprint]

Barton, Neil and Friedman, Sy-David
(2017)
*Maximality and Ontology: How axiom content varies across philosophical frameworks.*
[Preprint]

Barton, Neil and Friedman, Sy-David
(2019)
*Set Theory and Structures.*
[Preprint]

Bianchi, Andrea
(2017)
*On a logical argument against the naturalizability of reference.*
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 32 (2).
pp. 145-160.
ISSN 2171-679X

Bordg, Anthony
(2018)
*Univalent Foundations and the UniMath Library. The Architecture of Mathematics.*
[Preprint]

## C

Carnielli, Walter and Rodrigues, Abilio
(2017)
*An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth.*
[Preprint]

Corfield, David
(2018)
*Modal homotopy type theory.*
[Preprint]

## D

Darnell, Eamon and Thomas-Bolduc, Aaron
(2018)
*Is Hume's Principle Analytic?*
[Preprint]

Darnell, Eamon and Thomas-Bolduc, Aaron
(2018)
*Takeuti's Well-Ordering Proof: Finitistically Fine?*
[Preprint]

Dewar, Neil
(2018)
*Algebraic structuralism.*
[Preprint]

Dewar, Neil
(2018)
*On translating between logics.*
[Preprint]

Dewar, Neil
(2018)
*Supervenience, Reduction, and Translation.*
In: UNSPECIFIED.

Duzi, Marie
(2017)
*If structured propositions are logical procedures
then how are procedures individuated?*
[Preprint]

de Barros, Acacio and Holik, Federico and Krause, Décio
(2017)
*Contextuality and Indistinguishability.*
[Preprint]

## E

Eastaugh, Benedict
(2018)
*Computational reverse mathematics and foundational analysis.*
[Preprint]

Eastaugh, Benedict
(2018)
*Set existence principles and closure conditions: unravelling the standard view of reverse mathematics.*
[Preprint]

Ellerman, David
(2019)
*A Graph-theoretic Method to Define any Boolean Operation on Partitions.*
[Preprint]

Ellerman, David
(2017)
*Logical Information Theory: New Logical Foundations for Information Theory.*
[Preprint]

Ellerman, David
(2017)
*The Quantum Logic of Direct-Sum Decompositions:
The Dual to the Quantum Logic of Subspaces.*
[Preprint]

Eva, Benjamin and Hartmann, Stephan
(2018)
*Bayesian Argumentation and the Value of Logical Validity.*
[Preprint]

Eva, Benjamin and Ozawa, Masanao and Doering, Andreas
(2018)
*A Bridge Between Q-Worlds.*
[Preprint]

## F

Friend, Michèle and Khaled, Mohamed and Lefever, Koen and Székely, Gergely
(2018)
*Distances between formal theories.*
[Preprint]

## G

García Murga, Fernando
(2017)
*On Adversative Coordinative Conjunctions.*
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 32 (3).
pp. 303-327.
ISSN 2171-679X

Gyenis, Zalán
(2018)
*Finite Jeffrey logic is not finitely axiomatizable.*
[Preprint]

Gyenis, Zalán
(2018)
*On the modal logic of Jeffrey conditionalization.*
[Preprint]

Gyenis, Zalán
(2018)
*Standard Bayes logic is not finitely axiomatizable.*
[Preprint]

Gyenis, Zalán and Rédei, Miklós and Brown, William
(2018)
*The modal logic of Bayesian belief revision.*
[Preprint]

## H

Heartspring, William
(2019)
*Modal logic NL for common language.*
[Preprint]

Heartspring, William
(2019)
*A tautological interpretation of Godel's ontological proof.*
[Preprint]

Hewitt, Carl
(2019)
*For Cybersecurity, Computer Science Must Rely on Strong Types.*
[Preprint]

Hewitt, Carl
(2019)
*For Cybersecurity, Computer Science Must Rely on Strongly-Typed Actors.*
[Preprint]

Hewitt, Carl
(2019)
*For Cybersecurity, Computer Science Must Rely on Strongly-Typed Actors.*
[Preprint]

Hewitt, Carl
(2019)
*For Cybersecurity, Computer Science Must Rely on the Opposite of Gödel’s Results.*
[Preprint]

Hewitt, Simon
(2017)
*Frege's theorem in plural logic.*
[Preprint]

Hsiung, Ming
(2018)
*What Paradoxes Depends on.*
[Preprint]

Hudetz, Laurenz
(2018)
*Definable Categorical Equivalence.*
[Preprint]

## K

Khudairi, Hasen
(2017)
*Modal Ω-Logic: Automata, Neo-Logicism, and Set-Theoretic Realism.*
[Preprint]

Kovac, Srecko
(2018)
*On causality as the fundamental concept of Gödel's philosophy.*
[Preprint]

Krause, Décio
(2018)
*Quantum Mechanics, Ontology, and Non-Reflexive Logics.*
[Preprint]

## L

Lampert, Timm
(2017)
*Turing's Fallacies.*
[Preprint]

Landgrebe, Jobst and Smith, Barry
(2019)
*Making AI meaningful again.*
Synthese.
ISSN 1573-0964

Lefever, Koen and Székely, Gergely
(2017)
*Comparing classical and relativistic kinematics in first-order logic.*
[Preprint]

Lefever, Koen and Székely, Gergely
(2018)
*On Generalization of Deﬁnitional Equivalence to Languages with Non-Disjoint Signatures.*
[Preprint]

Liu, Yang
(2017)
*Frege's Begriffsschrift is First-order Complete.*
[Preprint]

## M

Maffezioli, Paolo and Varzi, Achille C
(2018)
*Intuitionistic Mereology.*
[Preprint]

## N

Nefdt, Ryan M.
(2018)
*Inferentialism and Structuralism: A Tale of Two Theories.*
[Preprint]

## P

Parker, Matthew W.
(2003)
*Undecidability in Rn: Riddled Basins, the KAM Tori, and the Stability of the Solar System.*
Philosophy of Science, 70 (2).
pp. 359-382.

Patton, Lydia
(2018)
*Laws of Thought and Laws of Logic After Kant.*
Logic from Kant to Russell.

Persichetti, Alessio
(2019)
*The later Wittgenstein’s guide to contradictions.*
[Preprint]

## R

Redhead, Michael
(2019)
*A Simplified Version of Gödel’s Theorem.*
[Preprint]

Rodin, Andrei and Krupski, Vladimir
(2017)
*Knowing-How and the Deduction Theorem.*
[Preprint]

## S

Saba, Walid
(2019)
*On the Winograd Schema: Situating Language Understanding in the Data-Information-Knowledge Continuum.*
[Preprint]

Sam, Baron
(2017)
*Mathematical Explanation by Law.*
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

Samaroo, Ryan
(2018)
*The Principle of Equivalence as a Criterion of Identity.*
[Preprint]

Sant'Anna, Adonai
(2018)
*Epistemology of quasi-sets.*
[Preprint]

Sarma, Gopal P. and Hay, Nick J.
(2017)
*Robust Computer Algebra, Theorem Proving, and Oracle AI.*
Informatica, 41 (4).
pp. 451-461.

Steeger, Jeremy
(2017)
*Betting on Quantum Objects.*
[Preprint]

## T

Teh, Nicholas and Kapulkin, Chris
(2018)
*BJPS Book Review of "Categories for the Working Philosopher".*
BJPS Book Review of "Categories for the Working Philosopher".

Tsementzis, Dimitris and Halvorson, Hans
(2016)
*Foundations and Philosophy.*
[Preprint]

## W

Weber, Keith
(2019)
*The role of syntactic representations in set theory.*
[Preprint]

Williamson, Timothy
(2018)
*Supervaluationism and good reasoning.*
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 33 (3).
pp. 521-537.
ISSN 2171-679X

warenski, lisa
(2009)
*Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the A Priori.*
Philosophical Studies, 142 (3).
pp. 403-426.
ISSN 0031-8116

## Y

Yuan, Yongfeng
(2030)
*Are synthetic a priori propositions informative?*
[Preprint]

## Z

Zhao, Kino
(2018)
*A statistical learning approach to a problem of induction.*
In: UNSPECIFIED.

Zhao, Kino
(2018)
*A statistical learning approach to a problem of induction.*
In: UNSPECIFIED.

This list was generated on **Thu Aug 22 23:41:08 2019 EDT**.